As supply chains become increasingly complex and global in their scale, supplier selection and management in the face of disruption risk has become one of the most challenging tasks for modern managers.
Introduction
Supply management in the face of disruption risk is an issue that modern managers face every day. In recent times, there have been several supply disruptions attributed to natural disasters. For instance, the spread of volcanic ash in Ireland in 2010 resulted in air transportation disruptions leading to component shortages at automakers such as Nissan and BMW (Miller, 2010) . More recently, earthquake and tsunamirelated disruptions have resulted in severe shortage of products and spare parts manufactured in Japan (Fink, 2011) . Examples also abound of supply disruptions due to other factors such as political uncertainty, nancial breakdown, weather, terrorism and strikes (refer to Tang, 2006; Gumus et al., 2012 and Sodhi et al., 2012 for more examples). Indeed, such disruptions have been blamed for signicantly lower operational performance and reduced protability for rms (Hendricks and Singhal, 2005) .
As many North American companies seek cheaper suppliers from developing countries, the risk associated with unproven suppliers has increased further. One particular decision facing managers in that context is how to allocate their orders between suppliers of diering costs and risks (e.g., a less risky but costly supplier from a developed country and a cheaper but more risky alternative from a developing country). This problem of order allocation in the face of supply risk, especially of the disruption type, has received signicant attention in theoretical and empirical OM literature. Several researchers have addressed such a procurement problem from a variety of perspectives (e.g., Hendricks and Singhal, 2005; Gurnani and Shi, 2006; Dada et al., 2007; Tomlin, 2009; Yang et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2009; Gumus et al., 2012) . But, many critical procurement decisions are inuenced by behavioral tendencies of managers. This has been studied in newsvendor (refer to §2 for details) and in several other contexts. For example, a eld study by Anderson et al. (2000) show that valuation of non-monetary attributes by procurement professionals is aected by their perceptions. In another paper, Carter et al. (2008) survey procurement professionals and compare the survey ndings to objective data; they nd that selection of suppliers from low-cost countries are inuenced signicantly by biases and perceptions of those professionals. Purchasing behavior of managers in the presence of supply risk has also been discussed in Zsidisin (2003) , Smith (2009) and Ellis et al. (2010) (we discuss this in more detail in §2). However, experimental investigation of ordering behavior focusing on supply disruption risk is limited in the extant literature. In this paper, we address this gap by comparing theoretical predictions with decisions made by subjects in an experimental setting.
We rst develop a theoretical model to establish the optimal procurement strategy of a risk-neutral buyer facing constant demand. The buyer has the option of buying from two suppliers one of which (say, R) is less risky but more costly compared to the other (say, U). Given our model setting, the optimal strategy for the buyer is to procure from only one of the two suppliers (i.e., sole-sourcing). Specically, when R is signicantly less risky or not too costly compared to U, then the buyer's optimal strategy is to select R. As the cost dierential increases or risk dierential decreases, the buyer's optimal decision changes and he must then sole-source from U. Subsequently, we utilize an experimental approach with performance-based payment for subjects who act as buyers and compare the results to the theoretical benchmark. Our experimental setup closely follows the theoretical one and focuses on six scenarios generated by combining the following: (i) low and high cost dierentials, and (ii) low, medium and high reliability dierentials, between the two suppliers.
Our examination of these various settings enables us to answer the following questions.
• How does the procurement strategy of the subjects compare to the theoretical optimal? What is the impact of the deviations, if any, from the theoretical optimal on the prots of the buyer?
• What behavior on the part of the subjects explains the observed deviations?
• How robust are the above results as it pertains to the experimental settings (e.g., paid vs. unpaid subjects) or measurement techniques?
Comparison of the experimental ndings to the theoretical solution reveals several insights.
First of all, the procurement strategy of the subjects diers signicantly from the theoretical optimal.
Specically, in contrast to the theoretical model, subjects overwhelmingly opt for dual-sourcing, i.e., order from both U and R. Subjects in our settings, on average, never allocate more than 61% to U or more than 74% to R. Interestingly, although subjects do not perform well when seen from the above perspective, they seem to be quite capable of accounting for the eects of cost and reliability dierentials in their decisionmaking. Specically, in line with the theoretical model, as the cost dierential between the two suppliers increases or the reliability dierential decreases, they allocate a higher proportion of the order to U, and vice versa. The non-optimal ordering decisions by the subjects can result in signicant prot penalty for the buyer ranging in our experimental settings from around 9% to 21%.
In addition to documenting the deviation from optimality, we also discuss why subjects exhibit the above behavior, which it should be noted cannot necessarily be explained by a risk-minimization approach.
Particularly, when the theoretical optimal is to order only from R, diversication results in the subjects actually injecting risk into a system when the optimal decision is risk-free. Our analysis suggests bounded rationality on the part of the subjects as a possible rationale. Indeed, subjects exhibit signicant amount of bounded rationality in all the six experimental settings. Furthermore, subjects are more boundedly rational when theoretically the order should go solely to the lower cost but risky supplier U, rather than when the optimal selection is the more expensive supplier R. Lastly, the above insights do not appear to be artifacts of our assumptions. Indeed, they remain qualitatively valid irrespective of whether or not: i) the subjects are paid, ii) they have previous exposure to possible benets of diversication (e.g., through courses in Finance), and iii) we allow subjects time to gain experience about the experimental setup. Our results also hold true even if we change certain measurement approaches, e.g., how we quantify the extent of diversication or whether we use averages or medians for statistical testing.
Related Literature
For a number of years, research in operations management (OM) has focused on building analytical and empirical models to analyze decisions made in operational settings. More recently, there has been considerable attention on decision-making behavior of managers in practice, especially when the theoretical structure of the problems is complex and the analytical solutions are not easy to implement. Two major areas of interest have emerged in the behavioral OM literature: Studying stocking decisions in the newsvendor setting because it serves as a well-understood archetype of stochastic inventory problems, and analyzing the causes and eects of uncoordinated supply chains. We oer a brief review of the rst stream, which is more related to our research. For the second stream we refer readers to Croson and Donohue (2006) , Loch and Wu (2008) , Wu (2009), Bendoly et al. (2010) and Kalkanci et al. (2011) .
The newsvendor problem has served as a cornerstone for the behavioral operations literature due to the problem's focus on managing overstocking and understocking risks, which are the primary drivers of many operational decisions. Whereas it is optimal to make a stocking decision that balances these two risks, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) found that orders by experimental subjects show signicant anchoring around the mean of the demand distribution. In a renement, Ben-Zion et al. (2008) show that subjects show learning behavior and their order sizes are between the mean demand and the quantity that maximizes the expected prot. As shown by Bolton and Katok (2008) , better decisions can be facilitated through experience and feedback as deliberate learning softens the anchoring eect around mean demand. Providing feedback with excessive frequency, however, can lead to undue focus on recent events and results in a performance decline (Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009 ). These and other papers (refer to Becker-Peth et al., 2012 for a recent review) have made signicant contributions to improving our understanding of how managers actually match supply and demand under demand uncertainty.
There is also a signicant and growing body of theoretical and empirical papers dealing with supply risk management that is closely related to our research. In particular, the paper by Dada et al. (2007) oers theoretical underpinnings for our experimental research. In their paper, the authors study the newsvendor problem with multiple unreliable suppliers and determine the optimal order allocation strategy when suppliers dier in terms of both costs and reliabilities. This and other such papers oer a robust theoretical framework for supply risk management under a variety of settings (e.g., see Gurnani et al., 2000; Tomlin, 2009; Yu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2009; Sodhi et al., 2012 and references therein) . There are also a number of data-or surveybased empirical papers that investigate related issues from a number of perspectives. For example, Wagner and Bode (2008) and Hendricks and Singhal (2005) discuss about the dierent types of possible supply risks and their eects on supply chain performance, Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) investigate the factors that can most eectively help a supply chain deal with such risks by increasing its agility, while Jiang et al. (2009) focus on understanding the causes and eects of labor-related supply risks. The few behavioral papers that exist in this stream primarily focus on how managers perceive risk, not necessarily disruption type, at dierent levels of organizations and how it aects business strategy including purchasing (e.g., Kraljic, 1983; Stone et al., 1994; Harrison et al., 2009; Smith, 2009; Puljic, 2010) . Among the papers that deal specically with supply disruption risk, Zsidisin (2003) uses case studies to dene such risk and illustrate how it can negatively aect business operations, while Ellis et al. (2010) use survey to address how managers perceive the probability and magnitude of disruption risk in their search for alternative source of supply. However, experimental investigation of order allocation decision between asymmetric suppliers (in terms of costs and risks), the focus of this paper, remains relatively less explored in the extant literature.
Our ndings reveal the use of a diversication strategy that leads to non-optimal order splitting. The prevalence of such a diversication bias when it is not optimal to diversify has been previously observed in consumption and investment decisions. Diversication in (simultaneous) consumption decisions was rst demonstrated by Simonson (1990) and later in investment settings by Benartzi and Thaler (2001) . Read and Loewenstein (1995) dub this phenomenon diversication bias, and Thaler (1999) explains it as a manifestation of the mental accounting's eect on ex-ante cost-benet analysis (also refer to Fox et al., 2005 for more details). We demonstrate that procurement decisions in the face of supply uncertainty can also be subject to diversication bias and also quantify the possible impact of such bias on the prot performance of the rm. Furthermore, we show that bounded rationality oers an explanation for this phenomenon in our case.
Thus, we complement works such as Ho and Zhang (2008) and Su (2008) , which have studied the impact of bounded rationality in other operational settings.
Behavioral Decision Making is clearly an important and growing area of research in Operations Management. Our contribution to this body of work is four-fold. We rst demonstrate a systematic diversication in procurement-related decision making in contrast to the sole-sourcing theoretical outcome and measure the impact of such diversication on the expected prots for the buyer under certain conditions. Second, we analyze the subjects' understanding of cost and capability dierentials between the suppliers and its eect on the order allocation decision. Third, we show that the above results are quite robust with respect to the experimental settings and measurement techniques. Finally, we discuss bounded rationality as a possible rationale for the above behavior of subjects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We rst develop several testable hypotheses based on a theoretical model in §3. Subsequently, we discuss the experimental design in §4.1 and results from the experiments in §4.2. The bounded rationality model is discussed in §5, while §6 checks the robustness of the results. The concluding discussion is provided in §7.
Theoretical Model and Hypotheses
In this section we develop a theoretical model of a buyer who is procuring a particular product from two heterogeneous suppliers, who are dierent in terms of their costs and reliabilities. In order to focus on the issue of supply risk, suppose that the end-customer price and demand for the product are constant (denoted by p and D, respectively). The buyer needs to satisfy this demand by procuring from suppliers U and R.
Any inventory excess to the requirement is worthless to the buyer, while any unmet demand results only in the loss of potential revenue p per unit.
As regards the two suppliers, it costs c u and c r per unit for each unit procured from U and R, respectively, where c u ≤ c r . 1 However, the cheaper supply source U is also less reliable. Specically, only supplier U faces supply risk, while supplier R is fully reliable in terms of delivering her order. In our setting, U faces two types of risks: a disruption risk because of which with probability p d the whole order allocated to this supplier would not be available for use by the buyer and a yield risk because of which, even when there is no disruption, only a random fraction of the order (α) is delivered to the buyer. We assume that the yield factor α is a positive random variable with distribution F and density f . Conversely, R faces neither disruption nor yield risk.
The objective of the buyer is to decide how much to order from each supplier so as to maximize his prot.
Suppose that the non-negative order quantities from U and R are q u and q r , respectively. Given the above conditions, we can show that the buyer's expected prot function is given by:
where E is the expectation operator. That is, the buyer needs to maximize Π by selecting the optimal q u and q r . Since the buyer faces a deterministic demand D, clearly, q r ≤ D. Analyzing the prot function, we can establish that (the proof is provided in Appendix A):
1 In order to rule out trivial results we assume p > cr. Specically, if U is uniformly distributed in
. In that case: The optimal prot for the buyer can be obtained by substituting q u = q * u and q r = q * r in the buyer's expected prot function Π.
Clearly, if U is not too unreliable in terms of disruption risk (i.e., if p d is not too high), then the optimal strategy for the buyer is to choose U ; otherwise he chooses R. Note that the threshold disruption risk level p d is a function of system parameters. Analyzing that threshold value we can deduce thatp d is decreasing in c u and increasing in c r . That is, as the disruption risk of the unreliable supplier U decreases (i.e., as the reliability dierential between the two suppliers decreases), it becomes more likely that the whole order will be allocated only to U. On the other hand, as the marginal cost of U increases or that of the reliable supplier R decreases (i.e., as the cost dierential between the two suppliers decreases), it becomes more likely that the whole order will be allocated only to R.
Based on the above theoretical model, we can then propose the following hypotheses about the optimal procurement strategy for the buyer.
• Hypothesis 1: Sole-Sourcing. When allocating order between suppliers U and R, the buyer will opt for sole-sourcing, i.e., allocate the entire order to either U or R.
• Hypothesis 2: Sensitivity of Ordering Decision.
• 2(a): Cost Dierential. As the cost dierential between suppliers U and R decreases, a larger proportion of the buyer's order will be allocated to R.
• 2(b): Reliability Dierential. As the reliability dierential between suppliers U and R decreases, a larger proportion of the buyer's order will be allocated to U.
Our primary objective in the paper is to test the above hypotheses through experiments and determine whether real-life subjects actually follow the above strategy and if not the extent and cause of their deviations.
Experimental Design and Results

Experimental Design
In this section, we describe the experimental design that we use to test the hypotheses of §3. Our experimental setting closely follows the theoretical model described above. The objective for the subjects is to act as the buyer and choose order quantities for a particular product from two suppliers with diering costs and risks (like U and R) with the aim of maximizing prot. We make the following common assumptions about the product throughout the experiments: i) the end-customer selling price is p = $45 per unit, ii) the endcustomer demand is known to be D = 100 units, iii) any leftover unit has no salvage value, and iv) any unsatised demand only results in lost revenue (i.e., $45 per unit) for the buyer. One of the suppliers is reliable (R) who can always deliver the exact amount of units requested from her and charges c r = $30
per unit. The other supplier, U, is cheaper, but faces disruption and yield risks. In all our experiments, if U 's supply is not disrupted, her yield is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0.5 and 1, i.e., if, for example, 80 units are ordered from U and the yield realization is 0.75, the buyer will only receive 60 units.
Conversely, if there is a disruption, there will be no supply from U .
We then generate six experimental settings. They dier in terms of cost and reliability dierentials between the two suppliers, based on two levels of marginal cost c u charged by U for each delivered unit and three levels of probability of supply disruption faced by U (i.e., p d ). Specically:
Cost Dierences: In three of the six of the settings, the marginal cost for U is assumed to be c u = $18
per delivered unit, which we refer to as the low-cost (LC) setting. In the remaining three high-cost (HC)
settings, c u = $23 per delivered unit. Note that LC setting (resp., HC setting) represents a high (resp., low) cost dierential between the suppliers.
Reliability Dierences: For each cost setting, we ran three experiments with the following probabilities of supply disruption p d : No disruption (NP) = 0, low probability of disruption (LP) = 0.2, and high probability of disruption (HP) = 0.5. Clearly, NP, LP and HP represent low, medium and high reliability dierentials between the suppliers, respectively.
The above scenarios give rise to the six settings showed in Table 1 below. The table also shows the optimal theoretical order quantities for each setting based on our analysis in the last section.
As regards the actual experiments, a total of 204 business students from a large public university participated in them. Subjects were recruited through a computerized pool, and randomly presented with one of the six settings during separate time windows. There were at least 32 subjects in each setting, and each subject participated in only one setting. Subjects who participated received performance-based monetary compensation in two parts. Specically, each subject received $6 for participating in the experiment and also a payment ranging from $6 to $14 based on their prot performance in the experiments. The higher the prot (i.e., closer it is to the theoretical optimal), the larger was the second part of the compensation.
The average compensation was around $16 per participant. In each setting, subjects were asked to decide how many units they wanted to order from each supplier. In order to ensure that the sequence of decision making does not aect the ndings, half the subjects were asked to ll out the order quantities from the unreliable supplier rst and the remaining half had the reliable supplier rst. The experiment was conducted in a behavioral lab with several computers. The problem was clearly explained to the subjects through a welcome screen that described the costs and risks involved (refer to Appendix B for a screenshot). In all settings, 30 rounds of the problem were presented to the subjects. In each round, after subjects decided their orders from each supplier, they were shown the actual delivered quantities, which depended on whether the unreliable supplier's supply was disrupted or not. The prots from the previous order were also shown at the end of each round. Subjects were told that their performance is judged based on the average prots they earn during the 30 rounds. At the end of the session, subjects were also asked to describe their thought process in a few words so that subjects who do not show any understanding of the problem could be removed from the nal sample.
Results
The results of the experiments are provided in Table 2 that shows the average order quantities from the two sources, i.e., (q u , q r ), and the number of subjects (n) in each of the six settings. We also include the corresponding theoretical optimals for each of the settings. Comparison of the theoretical and experimental values then enable us to test the hypotheses of §3.
Hypothesis 1: Sole-sourcing Hypothesis First, we note that the actual ordering quantities dier from the theoretical prediction. Recall that it is optimal to not order any units from the reliable supplier R in LCNP, LCLP and HCNP cases, and it is optimal to not order any units from the unreliable supplier U in the other cases. Yet, in the experiment subjects place orders that deviate from this optimal policy by ordering from both suppliers in all the six
q u = 70.7, q r = 44.0, n = 32 q u = 57.5, q r = 54.7, n = 34
q u = 45.1, q r = 62.1, n = 37 q u = 35.4, q r = 74.4, n = 32
q u = 33.3, q r = 80.4, n = 35 q u = 26.8, q r = 77.6, n = 34 To study this deviation systematically, we introduce a new measure termed Diversication Ratio. Specifically, we dene the average diversication ratio of subjects under each experimental setting as
where n represents the number of subjects participating in the particular setting, and q uit (resp., q rit ) represents the order placed by subject i in round t with supplier U (resp., supplier R). In our study, the diversication ratio is especially valuable to detect behavioral deviations because the theoretical diversication ratio is either 0 or 1 in all settings. Note that the theoretical value of diversication ratio is calculated in each setting as DR T = q * u / (q * u + q * r ), where q * u and q * r are the theoretically optimal quantities from suppliers U and R, respectively. We then compare DR E and DR T for each of the six settings in Table 3 , which also shows the t-statistic for our hypotheses that DR E = DR T . Subjects do not sole-source. The data strongly suggests that subjects do not follow the theoretically optimal strategy of exclusive sole-sourcing. In all six settings, subjects diversify by placing orders from both suppliers (in all settings, t (n) ≥ 6.81 and p < 0.001). In other words, regardless of the setting, the subjects dual-source and the diversication ratios of the subjects are signicantly dierent from 0 or 1, whichever is optimal. This establishes that Hypothesis 1 is not supported by our experiments.
Note that in the three settings in which DR T = 1, the tendency of subjects to allocate some of the demand to the reliable supplier can perhaps be explained by risk-aversion. However, in the settings in which DR T = 0, risk-aversion does not explain diversication. Indeed, because it is optimal even for a risk-neutral buyer to sole-source from the reliable supplier, a risk-averse subject should also avoid sourcing from the It is no surprise that subjects, on average, do not order the optimal quantities from the two suppliers in light of their failure to source exclusively from the optimal source as is evident from Table 2 . Clearly, subjects neither order D from the reliable supplier, nor do they order q * u from the unreliable one.
As an alternative method of characterizing the deviation from optimality due to diversication, we calculate the frequency with which subjects choose order quantities that are close to the theoretical optimal levels. Specically, suppose we consider an order quantity (q u or q r ) within 10 units of the theoretical solution (q * u or q * r , respectively) as a near-optimal decision by the subject. Interestingly, we nd that across the six experimental settings, subjects, on the average, place near-optimal q u and q r orders in only 24.3% and 32.2% of instances, respectively. Details for the dierent settings are provided in Table 4 . While this demonstrates that subjects are not optimizing, this also further underscores the need to understand whether subjects are internalizing the basic tradeo between cost and reliability, and whether they understand the implications of their ordering decisions.
Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b): Sensitivity Hypotheses
Although subjects clearly exhibit a tendency to utilize both sources, Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b) of §3
suggest that if they understand the basic tradeo they should at least increase the allocation to the reliable supplier if there is an increase in the cost or disruption probability of the unreliable supplier. We test these through several pairwise comparisons of ordering decisions.
Cost Dierential Eect. We know from §3 that, given a particular reliability dierential, as the cost of the unreliable supplier increases (relative to the reliable supplier), the diversication ratio DR decrease. In our experiment, for both NP conditions (i.e., p d = 0), DR T = 1 is optimal because of the high reliability of supplier U; and in both HP conditions (p d = 0.5), DR T = 0 is the optimal strategy. On the other hand, in the LP conditions (p d = 0.2), the optimal strategy switches from DR T = 1 to DR T = 0 as the cost of the unreliable supplier increases. In Figure 1 , the observed pair of diversication ratios for lowand high-cost settings are shown for each disruption probability condition (i.e., p d ). For p d = 0 and 0.2, we nd the diversication ratios in the low cost settings are signicantly higher than those in the corresponding high cost setting (p < 0.1 and p < 0.05, respectively); for the HC condition with p d = 0.5, the dierence is not signicant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2(a) is partially supported. Interestingly, subjects are sensitive to cost dierence particularly when the reliability dierence between the suppliers is lower (NP and LP cases).
This suggests that subjects use cost as a dierentiating aspect between suppliers especially when reliability dierences are minimal. Reliability Dierential Eect. The order quantities q u , q r for various disruption probability settings are given in Figure 2 . For a given cost dierential, as the reliability dierential between the two suppliers increases, we theoretically expect the diversication ratios to decrease, i.e., more order should be allocated to the reliable supplier R. Note that the theoretical diversication ratios DR T for the two dierent cost settings are as follows:
Low cost settings: DR T = 1, 1 and 0 for LCNP, LCLP, and LCHP settings, respectively;
High cost settings: DR T = 1, 0 and 0 for HCNP, HCLP, and HCHP settings, respectively.
For each cost setting, we nd that the average observed Diversication Ratio (DR E ) is, in general, signicantly decreasing with the probability of disruption p The support for the above hypotheses establishes that subjects tend to diversify signicantly more than what is theoretically necessary, but react appropriately (albeit insuciently) to any change in the cost or riskiness of the suppliers. The latter point is also supported by the fact that in all the three cells where the subjects decide to partly use the reliable supplier R (resp., risky supplier U) rather than the optimal strategy of only using supplier U (resp. supplier R), their total order sizes (q u + q r ) are smaller than the optimal order size of q * u (resp., q * r ) to account for the higher (resp., lower) reliability in the supplier base.
Supply Chasing. We also investigated whether subjects (within a setting) modify orders based on the performance of the unreliable supplier in the previous round. For example, subjects could employ a supply chasing heuristic, which would be similar to the demand chasing behavior proposed by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) in a newsvendor setting. This would imply that subjects will redirect orders away from the unreliable supplier to the reliable one following periods of disruption. We compare the average order values in periods following disruptions (q A u and q A r ) with the overall averages in the two suppliers, with only minor tweaks to the strategy once it is developed. Some subjects do follow a process similar to supply chasing. But this is counterbalanced by some others actually increasing orders from the unreliable supplier after rounds with poor yields or disruptions, perhaps assuming the probability of consecutive bad events to be minimal (i.e., they are perhaps not recognizing that events in dierent periods are independent).
3 Note that in two of the settings, LCNP and HCNP, there are no disruptions.
Impact of Allocation Decision on Prots
Until now we have focused on the nature of ordering decisions made by subjects in our experimental settings and showed a systematic deviation from optimality in the form of order diversication. This obviously raises the issue as to what are the implications of this behavior on the prots obtained. We dene the following new metric to quantify this impact.
• Average Prot Deviation: Our objective is to compare the average prots obtained by subjects with their actual orders to the expected prot that could have been obtained had they ordered the optimal quantities from the suppliers. The average prots obtained by subjects in a particular setting is simply
where π it represents the expected prot corresponding to the orders by subject i in round t of the experiment, and n is the number of subjects in the setting. Similar to the diversication ratio, we now calculate the average prot deviation for each setting as
where π * represents the optimal expected prot.
In Table 6 , for each setting, we show the optimal expected prots (π * ), the average prots obtained by subjects in the experiments π E , the associated average prot deviation ∆π * = π * −π E π * and the ranking of the deviation (1 representing the highest deviation and 6 the lowest). The prot impact of subjects deviating from the optimal orders ranges from 9% to 21% in various settings; moreover, all of these dierences are statistically signicant (p < 0.01, for all six settings). Interestingly, the highest average prot deviation is observed in LCNP setting (∆π * = 21.15%), although we know from Table 3 that the diversication ratio in this setting is not the worst (relative to the optimum) among all settings. Similarly, the HCLP setting where the smallest prot deviation is observed (∆π * = 8.85%), does not represent the best order quantity selection by the subjects. Comparing the prot impact of ordering decisions across dierent settings, we observe that the impact of diversication is especially stronger in the settings in which sole-sourcing from the unreliable supplier is optimal (i.e., DR T = 1: LCNP, LCLP and HCNP settings). Specically, diversication leads to an average prot reduction of 18.9% in these cells; but, the average prot reduction is 10.78% in the remaining three cells in which it is optimal to source exclusively from the reliable supplier (i.e., DR T = 0:
LCHP, HCLP and HCHP settings). While it is important to point out the above tendency of diversication in procurement (as well as its extent and impact), a related research issue then is to understand what explains the observed deviations. As discussed before in §4.2, risk-aversion is not able to do so in our setting. Note that loss aversion and regret aversion are also not able to explain the phenomenon since they too theoretically predict sole-sourcing as the optimal strategy 4 . However, in this section we develop a model of boundedly rational decision making in the context of our procurement problem that is indeed able to provide a plausible reason as to why the subjects are opting for the diversication strategy.
Following recent works like Su (2008) and Ho and Zhang (2008) , we consider a quantal choice model of decision-making. The salient aspects of such a model are: (a) individuals do not always pick the optimal alternative; (b) they consider all available options; (c) however, they are more likely to choose better options than worse ones. The probability of a particular decision i in such a choice model is proportional to some (non-decreasing) function of the utility obtained from that decision, u i . Within this framework, a common approach to modeling the variation in subjects' decisions is the logit choice model, wherein the probability of selecting i is proportional to e ui . To model bounded rationality, the logit choice probability of selecting choice i may be written (for a continuous decision domain) as
where β is the bounded rationality parameter. Note that β = 0 represents a scenario where decision-makers are perfectly rational and always select the utility maximizing choice (or one of the utility maximizing 4 Due to space constraints the details of this assertion are not included in the paper. They are available from the authors on request.
choices if there are several). On the other extreme, β → ∞ represents a situation where decision makers are randomly choosing alternatives with no motivation or ability to optimize; ψ (.) devolves into a uniform distribution in this case. We refer to Anderson et al. (1992) for more information about the logit choice model, and Su (2008) for a more recent and thorough discussion.
Theory
Unlike prior models on bounded rationality in operations that have involved a single decision, subjects in our experiment need to utilize a two-dimensional decision setup. However, the discrete choice model of bounded rationality can still be used as only the expected utilities of various choices matter. We rst describe the application of the logit choice model to each experimental setting.
Suppose that a particular combination of order quantities from the reliable and unreliable suppliers,
x i = {q ri , q ui }, yields an expected prot of f (x i ). For a given bounded rationality parameter β, the logit choice probabilities of each combination may be written as
The denominator may be imagined as the volume under the surface of the expected prot function (we have a two-dimensional decision space), with the shape of the surface itself depending on the parameter β. Therefore, we represent the denominator with V β = ∞ qui=0
∞ qri=0 e f (xi)/β . If subjects in the experiment are highly rational with β close to 0, a vast majority of their responses will be concentrated at or near the theoretically optimal combination of q u and q r . For higher levels of β, the responses will be more dispersed.
The expected distribution of responses as a function of the bounded rationality parameter β are illustrated in Figure 3 below.
a. β = 1 b. β = 100 c. . β = 1000 (2008), we assume a linear utility function and use f (x i ) as a substitute for u (f (x i )). However, this still preserves our goal, which is to ascertain if bounded rationality explains anomalous deviations from optimal decisions.
Suppose there are N observations in a particular experimental setting: x 1 , x 2 , ..., x N . The joint likelihood of obtaining this combination is given below (Casella and Berger, 2001 ).
As a measure of the bounded rationality in this setting, we will nd the β that maximizes (4). Equivalently, we can focus on the joint log-likelihood of
Estimations
The maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the bounded rationality parameter β * are presented in Table   7 for the six settings of our framework. The MLE estimates (β * ) are signicantly larger than 0 for all of them, indicating that the evidence of bounded rationality is strongly present in all six experimental settings.
The log-likelihood values of an arbitrarily small β are also given for comparison purposes. It is possible to consider a likelihood ratio test to consider the hypothesis that β is arbitrarily close to 0. Conservatively, a test statistic may be computed as χ 2 = 2 * (LL (β * ) − (LL (β = 1))). With 1 degree of freedom, the critical value of χ 2 (0.99) = 6.635, which is exceeded comfortably in each setting. Therefore, bounded rationality's role in the decisions we observe is strongly signicant in all the six settings.
As we saw in Figure 3 earlier, a larger value of β distributes responses away from the optimal combination.
An important consequence of this dispersion is the deviation from the sole-sourcing strategy. Indeed, for larger values of β, the majority of responses that have the same probability of occurrence do not result in sole-sourcing. In other words, the diversication decision that we observe in the experiment can be thought of as a result of boundedly rational decision-making on the part of subjects. Comparison of the MLE estimates of β * in the six dierent settings also suggest systematic dierences in the quality of decision-making. The β * values in the three settings in which it is optimal to source exclusively from the unreliable supplier (LCNP, LCLP and HCNP) are 379, 321 and 235, respectively. Interestingly, in the settings in which only the reliable supplier should be used, the β * values are 75, 96 and 99. This indicates that subjects make better decisions when the optimal strategy is to order exclusively from the reliable supplier supporting our result in §4.2. Note that risk-aversion would push subjects in all settings to allocate a greater share of orders to the reliable supplier. Therefore, risk-aversion would exacerbate the eect of bounded rationality when it is optimal to stay away from the reliable supplier; on the contrary, when the reliable supplier is the optimal choice, risk-aversion would naturally counteract the eect of bounded rationality by channeling more orders to the reliable supplier. So, while risk aversion is not able to fully explain the diversication phenomenon, it is perhaps able to explain relatively better decision-making by subjects when the optimal choice is to use only the reliable supplier.
Robustness Checks
The primary insight of this paper based on our experiments -that subjects display a tendency to diversify
signicantly more than what is theoretically optimal -turns out to be quite robust. In this section we discuss some of the conditions under which the insight continues to hold.
• Economic Incentives for Subjects: Previous research has shown that performance-based monetary incentives can play an important role in the results of behavioral experiments. For example, the outcomes of the probability matching experiments dier considerably based on whether or not the payments to the subjects are tied to their performances (Shanks et al., 2002) . As discussed in §4, in our case, on average, more than 60 percent of the payments to the subjects were based on their prot performances (compared to the theoretical optimal) implying that they had a signicant economic incentive for optimal decision-making. However, results from a quite similar laboratory experiment where the compensation for every subject was only the same amount of course credit for participation (i.e., the incentive was non-monetary and not tied to performance) were consistent with those from §4.2 (see Appendix C.1 for details). Specically, as is evident from Table 9 , the diversication ratios (i.e., DR E ) for the six settings in that case are also signicantly dierent from the theoretical optimals (i.e., DR T ) like in Table 3 of this paper. This suggests that the diversication tendency persists irrespective of whether the subjects are paid or unpaid. Indeed, when seen from an average perspective, the diversication ratios of the two groups (paid and unpaid) are not that dierent.
• Academic Background of Subjects: It might be hypothesized that since our subjects are business students, they may have been exposed to Finance courses, which focus on the merits of diversication, resulting in the tendency we observe in our experiments. In order to investigate this issues, we included a specic question in our questionnaire to ascertain whether or not subjects are familiar with the diversication strategy from previous Finance courses. It turns out that between 40 and 53 percent of the subjects were familiar across the six settings (with an overall average of around 45 percent), while the rest were not. However, both these groups showed signicant amount of order diversication in our experiments and, in general, there was not a signicant dierence between the diversication ratios of the two groups. More details are provided in Appendix C.2.
• Experience of Subjects: Recent research in a newsvendor-type ordering context has established that experimental results are not signicantly aected by whether the subjects are students or experienced managers (Bolton et al., 2012) . Moreover, in order to account for the time to develop experience about the game we also analyzed our setting by ignoring the rst 15 (resp., 20) periods. As is evident from Table 8 , a focused analysis on the orders from the last 15 (resp., 10) rounds of the experiment continues to support our main ndings related to diversication tendency discussed in §4.2. In this context it is important to point out that, although the diversication eect remains strong, our subjects improve their decisions over time, which is in line with ndings in the existing literature (Siegel, 1964; Prasnikar and Roth, 1992; Roth and Erev, 1995; Bolton and Katok, 2008) . We demonstrate this below by testing the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: With experience, subjects achieve diversication ratios (and optimal order quantities)
that are close to the theoretical optimum.
To measure any learning accrued over time, we calculate the average Diversication Ratio for each round and test whether it approaches the theoretical optimum over time. Following §4.2, the experimental diversication ratio may be dened for round t as
If subjects display improvements due to learning in any setting, we should observe an appropriate increase or decrease in DR Et with t, depending on whether the theoretical DR T for the setting is 0 or 1. In all settings, we note some improvement in performance over time. To test whether these eects are statistically signicant, we divide the 30 period horizon into two 15-period epochs. If subjects learn over time, we should nd that the average performance in Periods 16-30 is closer to the theoretical DR T than the average performance in Periods 1-15. These results are reported in Table 8 . In each setting, the average performance of subjects in the second 15 periods shows an improvement over the rst 15 periods. The improvements are statistically signicant in four settings, namely LCNP, LCLP, LCHP and HCHP 6 . We caution that our results are based on fewer number of periods than prior works that have specically focused on the impact of learning (Bolton and Katok, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009 • Measurement techniques: We use the expression in (1) to dene average diversication ratio in this paper. However, we can envision the following two alternative denitions for this ratio.
Once again, it turns out that the main insights of §4.2 remain valid even with the above alternative denitions. In a similar fashion, we note that the main results of §4.2 in terms of the signicant diversication in order allocation and consequent impact on prots continue to hold even if we use the median measure under the six settings, rather than mean for statistical testing (refer to Appendix C.3 for details).
6 Alternatively, we also considered improvement in the normalized prot performance of experimental subjects in each period. Specically, in each period, we calculate the (Average Prots from all Subjects)/(Prots that would have been obtained if the optimal orders were placed). This analysis yielded similar conclusions about the learning hypothesis.
In search of eciency, supply chains in many industries are becoming increasingly complex and global in nature and are facing increasing risk of possible disruptions in their procurement systems. In this context, managing the risk of production by carefully selecting suppliers has become a critical challenge. Naturally, this issue has attracted some much deserved attention from the academic literature in the past decade; several useful theoretical models (based on perfectly rational players) for balancing and minimizing supply risk have resulted from this eort (Tang, 2006; Sodhi et al., 2012) . A relevant issue in this context is the fact that sourcing decisions in many organizations are still inuenced at least partially by the behavioral tendencies/biases of individual managers. While this has been established through surveys in the extant literature (refer to §1 and §2 for references), experimental study of procurement strategy with an asymmetric supplier base remains a relatively open question. In this paper, we attempt to ll this gap regarding how individuals make sourcing decisions among multiple (asymmetric) suppliers in the face of possible supply disruption.
In our setting, the rm must decide how many units for a particular product to order from a reliable, but expensive, supplier and from an unreliable, but less expensive, supplier. To focus on supply risk, we create a stylized setting in which demand for the product is deterministic, and show that sole-sourcing from one of the suppliers is optimal (which supplier is optimal depends on the cost and risk parameters). Six dierent experimental variations of this model were presented to paid subjects, with two levels of cost dierences and three levels of supply risk dierences between the two suppliers. The parameters were chosen so that sole-sourcing from the reliable and unreliable suppliers were each optimal in three of the settings. While subjects demonstrate an understanding of the basic trade-o between cost and risk in managing suppliers, their decisions deviated from theoretical predictions in a systematic manner. Our experimental observations uncover an interesting phenomenon and subsequent analysis provides a possible explanation for it.
• Diversication Strategy: There is a strong evidence that subjects in our experiment adopt a diversication strategy by ordering from both suppliers instead of ordering exclusively from one supplier (which is the optimal strategy in our settings). This observation is present even in settings where it is optimal to ignore the risky supplier, implying that the tendency to diversify overcomes even risk-aversion. In fact, subjects are close to the optimal solution of sole-sourcing in less than one-third of the ordering instances. While supply diversication in practice has been theoretically explained as an optimal strategy to hedge risks (Babich et al., 2007) or motivate competition between suppliers (Tomlin and Wang, 2005) , our experiments suggest there is a possibility that diversication may arise in practice even due to bounded rationality of the decision-makers (see below). This implies that rms must actively review sourcing arrangements for inuences of unnecessary diversication.
• Eects of Cost/Risk Factors and Learning: Subjects do consider both cost dierences and disruption probability in determining what fraction of the demand must be allocated to each supplier. As our comparison between dierent settings reveals, the fraction of orders that go to the unreliable supplier decreases if that supplier's cost or risk increases. This suggests that when subjects are made aware of the cost-risk tradeo, and encouraged to consider the dierences, they can perhaps make better quality decisions. This is further borne by the fact that subjects, in general, seem to show an ability to improve their decisions over time as their exposure to the problem increases. Therefore, while simple heuristics may drive ordering decisions in the beginning, continued exposure to the problem appears to (partially) improve decision-making.
• Subjects are boundedly rational: We provide a rationale as to why the subjects in our experiments behave the way they do. Specically, we ascribe it to boundedly rational decision making on their part because of which while they are more likely to choose better options, they will most probably not choose the best one. This particular behavior is strongly present in all our experimental settings. Subjects seem to be especially boundedly rational when they should opt for the cheaper supplier. It might not be possible for real-life managers to be perfectly rational as assumed in many models; however, making them aware about underlying tendencies, which might aect their decisions, could potentially result in savings in supply chain costs.
• Robustness and Prot Implications: There are two other reasons as to why the above phenomenon might be of interest in practice. First, based on our experimental settings, the above diversication strategy can result in signicant prot penalty. As alluded to above, these losses seem to be especially signicant when the optimal strategy is to use only the cheaper (and more risky) supplier. Moreover, the diversication tendency result seems to be quite robust. It exists even when we use unpaid subjects or when we account for the possible lack of experience of the subjects or their academic background or when we test with alternate measurement approaches. This provides credence to the argument that our experimental results might indeed be valid in practice.
In order to focus on the dimension of supply risk, we created a stylized setting in which supply uncertainty was the salient issue. A natural limitation of this approach is that practical realities such as demand uncertainty had to be ignored. Future work should consider more realistic procurement problems by including aspects like demand stochasticity, multiple unreliable suppliers and information asymmetry. While our experiment provides limited support to the learning hypothesis, a future study over many more decision periods would be able to denitively identify the importance of experience. Lastly, though our paper oers behavioral insights into supply risk management, we do not consider the competitive and dynamic reasons for having a diverse set of suppliers or experimenting with real-life procurement professionals. These represent other directions for future experimental studies.
A Technical Appendix A.1
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. It can be easily shown that Π (q u , q r ) is jointly concave over q u and q r . Dene:
First order derivative of the buyer's prot function yields the following:
The optimal solution can then be derived from the rst order derivatives. The optimal solution can be derived from the rst order derivatives. . The optimal prot in that case is
Taking the rst order derivative of buyer's optimal prot over the disruption probability p d , we have, dΠ * u dp d = −D 2p − p(3c u + p) ≤ 0
The above inequality is due to the fact that (2p) 2 − p(3c u + p) = 3(p − c u )p ≥ 0. Since Π * r is independent of p d ,p d can can be detremined by for solving p d from equation Π * u = Π * r , which leads tô Students were also recruited to participate in a nearly identical experiment to the one described in §4.1. The two changes to the setting were (i) the cost of the unreliable supplier in the LC settings was c u =$15 (while in the experiments of the paper the corresponding cost was $18); (ii) any remaining units at the end of each period incurred a disposal cost of $5. The theoretical optimal strategy is identical to our main experiment: it is optimal to sole-source in this case as well, with the unreliable supplier being optimal in the LCNP, LCLP and HCNP settings (and the reliable supplier being optimal in the remaining three settings).
More importantly, students in this experiment were not paid based on their performance. They only received course credit for their participation. As reported in Table 9 , we nd that the fundamental results regarding diversication continue to exist even in this unpaid setting. In general, paying subjects did not seem to aect the experimental outcomes signicantly. Subjects were separated into two groups based on whether or not they indicated awareness of diversication principles from prior Finance courses. Table 10 summarizes our ndings. First, we nd that regardless of their prior knowledge from Finance education, they have diversication ratios that are signicantly dierent from the theoretical optimal levels. Further, we also nd that in 5 of the 6 settings, the dierences between paid and unpaid subjects are not signicant.
Columns 3 and 4 in the table (resp., columns 5 and 6) provide the diversication ratios and the p values for the comparisons with theoretically optimal levels for subjects with (resp., without) prior familiarity with diversication. In column 7, we provide the p values obtained by comparing the DR E values for the two groups of subjects, which suggest that they are not signicantly dierent. 
